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Donald R. Lehmann · Mercedes Esteban-Bravo
Abstract This paper uses an analytical model to examine when it makes sense to
provide incentives to innovators to adopt a new product. The model allows for separate
segments of innovators and imitators, each of which follows a Bass-type diffusion
process. Interestingly “seeding” the market is optimal for a limited range of situations
and these do not appear to include those where there is a downturn in sales (chasm)
as sales move from the first to the second segment.
Research has frequently identified different segments of adopters of new products.
Categorizations include innovators vs imitators (Bass, 1969; Rogers, 1995; Mahahan et
al., 1990; Im et al., 2003), technophiles vs “normal” people, and business vs consumer
users. Further, considerable effort has gone into studying the influence of members of
the first group on the second.
This paper focuses on when, if ever, it makes sense for a manufacture of a new
product to “seed” the market by subsidizing a few early adopters to speed the adoption
process. The paper builds on earlier work by Kalish and Lilien (1983) which focused
on the impact of widely available government subsidies on the adoption of socially
desirable innovations (i.e. alternative energy sources) as well as the work of Jain et al.
(1995). Unlike that work, we concentrate on providing subsidies (here free goods) to
selective individuals in the context of a model which allows for separate segments of
innovators and imitators and nests the standard Bass (1969) model.
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Background
The diffusion of new products is one of the most widely studied topics in marketing
(Hauser et al., 2004). A large percentage of this work is based on the Bass (1969)
model. This model parsimoniously describes S-shaped diffusion patterns by assuming
a single diffusion pattern with separate coefficients capturing innovation and imitation
tendencies.
Research focused on multiple diffusion processes has appeared in various forms.
For example, Norton and Bass (1987) studied the adoption of successive generations of
technology. Closer to the current problem, several researchers have looked at diffusion
across countries, i.e. different populations (Dekimpe et al., 2000; Gatignon et al.,
1989; Kalish et al., 1995; Putsis and Sen, 2001; Putsis et al., 1997; Takada and Jain,
1991; Tellis et al., 2003). In contrast to these papers, this paper looks at different
segments within the same geographic area and time period. It does so using a latent
class approach, rather than capturing heterogeneity within a single population (e.g.,
Bemmaor and Lee, 2002). Perhaps the closest work is that of Jain et al. (1995) which
examined optimal sampling in the context of a single population and suggested it tends
to be about 5% of the population for durables.
A related area of work concerns the impact adoption by others has on the value of
a good, aka network externalities (cf Naik et al., 2003). Much of this work focuses
on the implications of network effects on company behavior and the emergence of
industry standards (e.g., Arthur, 1989; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Gupta et al., 1999;
Katz and Shapiro, 1985). For example, Sun et al. (2004) consider four strategies for
innovators in a market with network effects. Other work centers on the notion of an
information cascade (e.g., Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Golder and Tellis, 2004).
Some work explicitly considers two segments. Goldenberg et al., (2002) used cellu-
lar automata to simulate diffusion in two segments and found it can produce a “saddle”
(a slow down in and then resumption of growth) in the diffusion pattern. Similarly
Muller and Yogev (2004) studied 35 electronics markets and found empirical evidence
for a saddle in 26 of them. In addition, Van den Bulte and Joshi (2005) built a two seg-
ment model and showed that for 33 cases it fits better than single population models.
We use a similar model in this paper as the basis for our analytical results.
Other work has focused on the lead time until a product “takes-off” (Golder and
Tellis, 1997; Kohli et al., 1999). Although this work does not explicitly consider two
segments, the pattern established is consistent with a delay in time before a product
enters a broader (mass) market.
The focus on firm behavior (rather than describing or predicting customer behavior)
has a long history. Horsky and Simon (1983) incorporated the impact of advertising on
diffusion, Robinson and Lakhani (1975) considered price, and Kalish and Lilien (1983)
examined the role of price subsidies. Mahajan and Muller (1998) examined when it is
optimal to target the mass market rather than innovators using a two segment model
of pure innovators and pure imitators. This paper extends that work by considering
the benefits of a subsidy to innovators for the purpose of speeding adoption in the
second (larger) segment when the two segments have a propensity to both innovate
and imitate.
This paper first describes when it is profitable to “seed” a diffusion process by giving
away a product in a two segment world. The impact of varying model parameters on the
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optimal subsidy and profit is examined using numerical methods. The paper concludes
with discussion and suggestions for future research.
A two segment model
The model assumes there are two segments: innovators where imitation is only due to
adoptions within this group (i.e. B to B adoption only depends on adoption by other
business) and imitators who are influenced by adoption in both groups.
The model
For both groups we assume adoption follows the Bass (1969) model in discrete time.
We assume that m is the total market potential and θ is the proportion of first group
potential to total market potential. Therefore, m1 = θm and m2 = (1−θ )m. Similar to
the extended Bass model (Bass et al., 1994) and the models of Robinson and Lakhani
(1975) and Kalish and Lilien (1983), we assume price has a multiplicative impact
on the hazard function. In the first segment the basic hazard function (probability of
purchasing) is given by:
H1(t) =
(
p1 + q1 F1(t)
m1
)
(1)
and sales are S1(t) = H1(t)(m1 − F1(t)), where F1(t) is the cumulative adoption at
time t. In the second segment the hazard rate is:
H2(t) =
(
p2 + q12 F1(t)
m1
+ q2 F2(t)
m2
)
(2)
and sales are S2(t) = H2(t)(m2 − F2(t)), where F2(t) is the cumulative adoption at
time t. Here q12 represents the effect of adoption by the first segment on the second and
q2 the imitation effect within the second segment. While not a model requirement, we
would generally expect q2 > q12, i.e. imitators are more influenced by the adoption of
other imitators than adoption by innovators. The model has several special cases.
1. θ = 1 (or 0) The model reduces to a single population Bass model.
2. q12 = 0 In this case, the two segments operate independently from each other, i.e.
adoption in one group has no influence on adoption in the other
3. p2 = 0 In this case, imitators only adopt through the influence of others.
4. q1 = 0 Here the innovator segment strictly innovates, i.e. is uninfluenced by the
actions of others.
A priori, we expect the first segment to consist of innovators and early adopters
in the Rogers (1983) framework, thus representing about 16% of the total market.
Following Muller and Yogev (2004), Goldenberg et al. (2002) and Van den Bulte
and Joshi (2005), we examine the special case where p2 = 0. This is consistent with
behavioral descriptions of late majority and laggards as non-innovative (i.e. p = 0).
Diffusion clearly can be impacted by marketing actions. Here we consider the
impact of price. By using exp (– b1 price) as a multiple of the hazard rate, we have
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zero sales at an infinitive price and the base hazard rate sales at zero price. Specifically,
taking into account the impact of prices, the first segment sales are given by
S1(t) = H1(t)(m1 − F1(t)) exp(−b1 pr (t))
=
(
p1 + q1 F1(t)
m1
)
(m1 − F1(t)) exp(−b1 pr (t)) (3)
and the second segment sales by
S2(t) =
(
p2 + q12 F1(t)
m1
+ q2 F2(t)
m2
)
(m2 − F2(t)) exp(−b2 pr (t)) (4)
where pr (t) denote the price at time t . We allow price to vary over time and investigate
how it should be set in order to optimize profits.
The role of subsidies
One way to encourage sales is to subsidize adoption in the first segment (we consider
subsidies to the second segment later) by giving the product to some or all members
of the first segment, in effect “seeding” the population. Examples include provision of
products to celebrities or key influentials whose behavior is then copied by the mass
market.
Specifically, we allow the manager to subsidize d members of the first segment
(up to a maximum of m1, the market potential) at a variable cost of f per customer.
(In the case of give-aways, f becomes variable cost plus any delivery, etc. expenses).
Note this differs from a price (promotion) subsidy available to the entire population as
analyzed by Kalish and Lilien (1983). We assume the manager can identify who is in
the innovator segment but not who within this segment will buy first (i.e. p1 is constant
across the group). When samples are given in the first period to the first segment, the
sales of the first segment in the first period are thus
S1(1) = p1(m1 − d) exp(−b1 pr (1)) (5)
and the total adoption is
F1(1) = p1(m1 − d) exp(−b1 pr (1)) + d (6)
Thus give-aways decrease sales in the first period and increase them in subsequent
periods.
Variable costs
We allow variable costs (vc(t)) to vary over time. Generally we expect them to decrease
as experience curve effects manifest themselves. As we later show, the optimal path for
price depends, unsurprisingly, on the pattern of variable costs over time. For simplicity,
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and since including them does not alter the character of the results, we assume fixed
costs are zero (e.g., sunk).
The existence of a saddle
Since the work by Moore (1999), the notions of crossing the chasm and a saddle
have been widely discussed if infrequently formally tested. We examined numerical
simulations to see when a saddle in the total sales curve appears using the meta-
analysis of Sultan et al. (1990) to inform the results. Specifically, we assumed the
initial (innovator) segment had relatively large coefficients of innovation and imitation.
We also assumed the first group was a relatively small fraction of the total potential
market.
Interestingly, saddles only appear when the crossover imitation effect between the
two segments (q12) is low, the first segment peaks early (p1is fairly large), and the size
of the first segment (θ ) is moderate. When θ is small, the impact of the first group
on total sales is minimal; when θ is large, the impact of the second is small. In either
case, a saddle does not appear.
A saddle does appear in conditions suggested by the literature. For example, if
the first segment has p1 = .03 and q1 = .30 (the averages reported by Sultan et al.
(1990)), the second segment has p2 = .0001, q12 = 0.01, and q2 = 0.10 (i.e. diffusion
is slower in the second group) and θ=.15, a clear saddle emerges. In general the results
suggest a saddle will occur when a product is complicated and/or not compatible with
current ones (leading to a low p2) or there is a benefit to waiting such as network
externality (low q2), consistent with Van den Bulte and Joshi (2005).
Optimal behavior
We focus on a three period model. Clearly if there is an infinite time horizon and a
zero discount rate, subsidizing early adopters merely reduces sales. However, money
has time value meaning that results in future periods have less and less value. In addi-
tion, for many products subsequent entry by competitors drives profit margins down
toward pure competition levels. There is also the risk of technological obsolescence
whereby a superior new technology captures the market from an older one. These is-
sues are especially relevant for smaller firms and start-ups who have limited resources
and, often, limited interest in operating in the long run (vs., say, selling out). As a
consequence, it is reasonable to argue that a limited horizon model is applicable to
many real situations. (If one wanted to capture, say, the first nine years of a diffusion
process, they could consider three three-year periods, with the main impact being that
the values of p and q would differ from those in an annual model).
Using three periods allows for an adoption by someone in the first segment in
period one to be imitated by someone in the second segment in period two who then
influences further adoption in the second segment in the third period. This allows us
to capture the nature of the results while remaining reasonably tractable. Since most
profits are often made early in the product life cycle, this captures the most critical
period for the firm. Because subsidizing someone in the first segment in the first period
dominates subsidizing them in subsequent periods in terms of their effect on adoption
by others, we only consider subsidies in the initial period.
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Let:
β = the discount factor i.e. 1
1 + r where r is the discount rate,
pr(t) = unit price at time t,
vc(t) = unit cost at time t,
d = number subsidized,
f = cost of a single subsidy.
The firm faces the problem of maximizing profit with respect to the number subsidized
in period 1 and price in the three periods:
max
3
∑
t=1
β t−1(pr (t) − vc(t))(S1(t) + S2(t)) − d f,
subject to the following constraints:
S1(1) = p1(m1 − d) exp(−b1 pr (1)),
S2(1) = p2m2 exp(−b2 pr (1)),
S1(2) =
[
p1m1 + (q1 − p1)(S1(1) + d) − q1
m1
(S1(1) + d)2] exp(−b1 pr (2)),
S2(2) =
[
p2m2 + q12
m1
m2(S1(1) + d) + (q2 − p2)S2(1)
−q12
m1
(S1(1) + d)S2(1) − q2
m2
S2(1)2
]
exp(−b2 pr (2)),
S1(3) =
[
p1m1 + (q1 − p1)(S1(1) + S1(2) + d) − q1
m1
(S1(1) + S1(2) + d)2
]
exp(−b1 pr (3)),
S2(3) =
[
p2m2 + q12
m1
m2(S1(1) + S1(2) + d) + (q2 − p2)(S2(1) + S2(2))
−q12
m1
(S1(1) + S1(2) + d)(S2(1) + S2(2)) − q2
m2
(S2(1) + S2(2))2
]
exp(−b2 pr (3)).
Substituting the constraints into the firm’s objective function leads to a notationally
cumbersome problem for which numerical resolution typically is computationally
expensive, in both time and memory requirements. A standard approach to solve large-
dimensional optimization problems is to exploit the special features of the problem. In
this case, we reduce the computational cost in terms of function evaluations and number
of iterations, re-writing the unconstrained formulation as a constrained problem which
treat the sales equations as constraints. Both formulations are equivalent, but the
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constrained one is less costly to implement . The Lagrangian is defined by
L(d, pr (1), pr (2), pr (3), λ)
=
3
∑
t=1
β t−1(pr (t) − vc(t))(S1(t) + S2(t)) − d × f
+ λ1[S1(1) − p1(m1 − d)exp(−b1 pr (1))]
+ λ2[S2(1) − p2m2exp(−b2 pr (1))]
+ λ3
[
S1(2) −
[
p1m1 + (q1 − p1)(S1(1) + d) − q1
m1
(S1(1) + d)2
]
exp
(
−b1 pr (2))
]
+ λ4
[
S2(2) −
[
p2m2 + q12
m1
m2(S1(1) + d) + (q3 − p2)S2(1)
− q12
m1
(S1(1) + d)S2(1) − q2
m2
S2(1)2
]
exp(−b2 pr (2))
]
+ λ5
[
S1(3) −
[
p1m1 + (q1 − p1)(S1(1) + S1(2) + d)
− q1
m1
(S1(1) + S1(2) + d)2
]
exp(−b1 pr (3))
]
+ λ6
[
S2(3) −
[
p2m2 + q12
m1
m2(S1(1) + S1(2) + d) + (q2 − p2)(S2(1) + S2(2))
− q12
m1
(S1(1) + S1(2) + d)(S2(1) + S2(2)) − q2
m2
(S2(1) + S2(2))2
]
exp(−b2 pr (3))
]
.
The Lagrange multipliers facilitate the characterization of optimal solutions, and
also provide sensitivity information, quantifying the first-order variation in the optimal
profit caused by variations in sales. The Lagrange multipliers λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6 at
the optimum represent the value of one additional sale in each of the three periods
(λ1, λ3, λ5 for the first segment and λ2, λ4, λ6 for the second segment). As is logical,
the value of one additional sale decreases over time (λ1 > λ3 > λ5 and λ2 > λ4 > λ6)
and is equal and positive in both segments in the last period (λ5 = λ6). Further, they are
all positive, consistent with both the time value of money and the greater cumulative
influence impact of earlier adoption.
Numerical results
We initially calculated the optimal values of the decision variables for several sets of
parameters. As a base case, we assumed an arbitrary total market size of 5,000. We
used coefficients of innovation of 0.05 and 0.01 and coefficients of imitation of 0.6
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Table 1 Parameters’ used in the
analyses p1 = 0 05
q1 = 0 6
p2 = 0 01
q12 = 0, 0 3, 0 05, 0 6
q2 = 0 3
vc = (1, 0 9, 0 85); (1, 1, 1); (1, 0 6, 0 4)
r = 0 25, 0 10 (so β = 0 8, 0 91)
b1 = 1, 0 25
b2 = 1
θ = 0 06, 0 01, 0 16
f = 1, 2The first value represents the
base case
and 0.3 for the innovator and imitator segments respectively to reflect the range found
in Sultan et al. (1990). For the coefficient of imitation for the second segment based
on adopters in the first segment (q12) we initially used .30. We assumed innovators
were 6% of the population. We also assumed the variable cost was 1 and decreased to
90 and 85% of the first period’s level over the three periods.
To capture the effect of price, we initially set b1, and b2 to 1. This implies a price
elasticity of −1, less than the average of −1.76 reported by Tellis (1998) since new
products are rarely bought primarily on a price basis. We also set f = 1, i.e. the variable
cost of the product, for the base case. The conditions used are summarized in Table 1.
For the base case, the optimal decision (Table 2) is to subsidize about 50% (146 of
300) of the first segment by giving them the new product. Price declines somewhat
but is essentially constant. Sales are limited in the first segment but substantial in the
second although cumulative sales of 249 represent a small fraction (6%) of the 4500
potential purchasers.
In order to estimate the sensitivity of the optimal solution to the various model
parameters, we varied one at a time using the levels in Table 1. The number subsidized
decreases as the imitation effect of the first group on the second (q12) goes down and
reaches 0 at q12 = .05 and increases to 300 (100%) when the first group has a strong
impact on the second (q12 = .6). A lower discount rate leads to more subsides as do
more rapidly decreasing variable costs.
More interesting, as the size of the first segment (θ) moves toward zero, so does
the number of subsidies. The number (and percent) subsidized decreases when θ
becomes large. Thus subsidies are most beneficial when there is a small but not very
small first segment. The size of the first segment also impacts the pricing pattern with
higher and decreasing prices for a smaller (θ = 0.01) and lower but increasing prices
for a larger first segment (θ = 0.16). More expensive subsidies lead to both a lower
initial price and increasing prices across the three periods. When the variable cost
is constant, optimal price increases over the three periods. If variable cost decreases
substantially, so does price but not by as much in percentage terms. This suggests that
in the absence of competition and scale economies, variable margins should increase
over time. Interestingly, it does not appear to be worthwhile to subsidize customers in
the first segment in those cases where a saddle occurs in the demand curve (e.g., for
θ = 0.16). In other words, it doesn’t make sense to subsidize innovators in order to
cross the chasm when the innovators and imitators operate separately.
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Table 3 Optimal percent to subsidize regression
Segment 1 Segment 2
Parameter Coefficient t Parameter Coefficient t
θ 10 43 15 69 θ 0 22 6 95
p1 −0 87 −5 59 p1 0 0018 1 65
q1 −0 84 −5 30 p2 −0 038 −3 31
q12 2 54 23 89 q12 −0 033 −8 54
θ2 −52 15 −16 31 q2 −0 016 −2 46
p12 0 82 3 87 θ2 −0 93 −6 11
q12 0 77 3 46 q122 0 027 6 79
q122 − 1 88 −17 28 q22 0 025 2 94
Optimal behavior: Subsidies to both groups
While the logic of the paper is based on the notion of subsidizing members of the
first segment, obviously it is possible to subsidize members of the second segment as
well. To deal with this situation, we created 368 scenarios representing different values
of the parameters and numerically estimated optimal subsidies in both segments. To
simplify the task, we assumed the variable cost was equal to the cost of subsidy at one
(vc = f = 1) and set the price to 2 (a 100% markup).
In order to interpret the results, we ran regressions of the optimal percent to subsidize
in each segment against the model parameters. In order to allow for non-linearities we
included both linear and quadratic terms. Table 3 presents the results for a reduced
model which includes significant predictors.
Using the parameters from Table 3, we determined the values of each parameter
which lead to maximum (or minimum) subsidy by taking derivates of the appropriate
regression parameters and setting them equal to zero. In the first segment, the optimal
percent to subsidize is largest when θ is close to10%, and smallest when p1 and q1 are
close to 0.5. The only other significant influence is q12 the cross-population coefficient:
subsidies are maximum for q12 of 0.67. Subsidies to the second segment are greatest
for θ equal to about 12%. They increase slightly in p1 and decrease in p2, as expected.
Subsidies are smallest for q12 of about .60 and q2 of about .30. Note that a q2 of .30
is close to the mean found in prior research which may explain the lack of significant
subsidies in most durable categories.
Discussion
This paper has demonstrated conditions under which it is optimal to “seed” a market
consisting of two segments by giving away some of the product to innovators. Essen-
tially this occurs when there is a small group of slow to adopt on their own customers
who influence other customers.
Aside from the obvious implication that before deciding to subsidize managers
should know their p’s and q’s (and θ ), a manager could use the model to consider
strategies to improve adoption. For example, it may be possible to increase q12 (i.e.
WOM from innovators to imitators) through general publicity about early adopters
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or by viral marketing. In any event, subsidizing innovators should be more useful for
cases where innovators (experts, opinion leaders) are most influential such as fashion
goods or business technology.
More generally, a number of complications could be added to the situation. These
include incorporating other decision variables such as advertising, incorporating a
channel structure where the channel makes decisions about stocking levels, and al-
lowing for subsequent competition. One can also expand the model to allow adop-
tion in the second segment to influence adoption in the first. In addition, it would
be useful to develop methods for estimating the model, especially when only ag-
gregate data is available. Hopefully future research will deal with these and other
issues.
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